replaced with externally-enqueued build/css/frontend.css * (versioned via build/css/frontend.asset.php; RTL via wp_style_add_data). * 4. Nonce action is PER-CODE — 'cli_auth_approve_' . $code — so a nonce * minted for code A cannot be replayed against code B (SEC-002 / CWE-352). * * Security hardening baked in (2026-06-30 plan-level security review): * - SEC-001 / S9 (CWE-451/CWE-441): displayed server slug sourced from * CliController::peek_pending_server($code), NOT $_GET['server']. * - SEC-002 (CWE-352): per-code nonce as above. * - SEC-005 (CWE-1004): 503 disabled notice carries Retry-After + noindex. * * Singleton + private ctor (A2 / S6). Zero hooks in the constructor (A1) — * Main::define_public_hooks wires every callback via the Loader. The static * get_base_url() helper is the one piece other modules (CliController, * Activator) couple to (pending A9 promotion via DEV3 / tasks.md T044). * * @package AcrossAI_MCP_Manager\Public\Partials */ namespace AcrossAI_MCP_Manager\Public\Partials; use AcrossAI_MCP_Manager\Includes\REST\CliController; defined( 'ABSPATH' ) || exit; final class FrontendAuth { const PAGE_SLUG = 'acrossai-mcp-manager'; const QUERY_VAR = 'acrossai_mcp_auth'; /** * Singleton instance. * * @var self|null */ protected static $_instance = null; /** * Singleton accessor. */ public static function instance(): self { if ( null === self::$_instance ) { self::$_instance = new self(); } return self::$_instance; } /** * Private — use ::instance() instead. Prevents B5 double-registration. */ private function __construct() {} /** * Base URL of the approval page — `https://{site}/acrossai-mcp-manager/`. * * Static so callers (CliController::handle_auth_start, Activator) can * reach it without holding a singleton reference. MUST NOT be changed to * admin_url(...) — the page resolves on the front-end (FR-006). */ public static function get_base_url(): string { return home_url( '/' . self::PAGE_SLUG . '/' ); } /** * Register the single rewrite rule. Wired on `init` via Loader. * * Pattern has no `.` to escape — B4 not triggered here. */ public function register_rewrite_rule(): void { add_rewrite_rule( '^' . self::PAGE_SLUG . '/?$', 'index.php?' . self::QUERY_VAR . '=1', 'top' ); } /** * Append the custom query var. Wired on `query_vars` via Loader. * * @param array $vars * @return array */ public function add_query_var( array $vars ): array { $vars[] = self::QUERY_VAR; return $vars; } /** * Enqueue the consent-page CSS — ONLY on the consent page. Wired on * `wp_enqueue_scripts` via Loader (FR-013). * * Reads the version from build/css/frontend.asset.php (emitted by the * `wordpress/scripts` build pipeline). Falls back to the plugin version * constant if the manifest is missing — no error_log per research §R2 * (silent fallback; deploy-time gate in T037 catches the misconfiguration). */ public function enqueue_assets(): void { if ( ! get_query_var( self::QUERY_VAR ) ) { return; } $plugin_dir = dirname( \ACROSSAI_MCP_MANAGER_PLUGIN_FILE ); $plugin_file = \ACROSSAI_MCP_MANAGER_PLUGIN_FILE; $asset_path = $plugin_dir . '/build/css/frontend.asset.php'; $version = \ACROSSAI_MCP_MANAGER_VERSION; if ( is_readable( $asset_path ) ) { $asset = require $asset_path; if ( is_array( $asset ) && isset( $asset['version'] ) && is_string( $asset['version'] ) && '' !== $asset['version'] ) { $version = $asset['version']; } } wp_enqueue_style( 'acrossai-mcp-frontend', plugins_url( 'build/css/frontend.css', $plugin_file ), array(), $version ); // RTL variant per FR-013 clarification — WP auto-substitutes // build/css/frontend-rtl.css when is_rtl() returns true. wp_style_add_data( 'acrossai-mcp-frontend', 'rtl', 'replace' ); } /** * Dispatch on `template_redirect` — branches by `?action=…`. * * Wired via Loader on `template_redirect` priority 10. Implements FR-007 * steps 1–7 in exact order. Note: `?server=` is NOT parsed here per the * 2026-06-30 SEC-001 amendment — handle_cli_auth derives the slug from * the transient via CliController::peek_pending_server. */ public function maybe_render_page(): void { if ( ! get_query_var( self::QUERY_VAR ) ) { return; } nocache_headers(); if ( ! is_user_logged_in() ) { // R3 amendment 2026-07-15: preserve `?action=cli_auth&code=X` in // the redirect target so the user lands back on the consent page // after login. `code` is validated against hex format // (/^[a-f0-9]{32}$/) BEFORE inclusion — any deviation falls // through to the base-URL-only path per the original R3 // conservatism. `server` is intentionally NOT preserved (it's // fetched from the transient per SEC-001). `_wpnonce` is // generated fresh on return inside handle_cli_auth. Load-bearing // invariant: the hex regex mitigates R3's original `//` scheme- // relative injection concern — do NOT loosen it without a // security-constraints.md update. // phpcs:disable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended -- read-only param extraction; the state-mutating cli_auth_approve branch verifies its per-code nonce explicitly inside handle_approve(). $raw_code = isset( $_GET['code'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['code'] ) ) : ''; $raw_action = isset( $_GET['action'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['action'] ) ) : ''; // phpcs:enable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended $redirect_to = self::get_base_url(); if ( 'cli_auth' === $raw_action && 1 === preg_match( '/^[a-f0-9]{32}$/', $raw_code ) ) { $redirect_to = add_query_arg( array( 'action' => 'cli_auth', 'code' => $raw_code, ), $redirect_to ); } wp_safe_redirect( wp_login_url( $redirect_to ) ); $this->terminate(); } // FR-007.4 — NO current_user_can() check. Any logged-in user may // consent on their own behalf. Threat-model rationale in spec §Assumptions. // phpcs:disable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended -- read-only render of GET params; the state-mutating cli_auth_approve branch verifies its per-code nonce explicitly inside handle_approve(). $action = isset( $_GET['action'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['action'] ) ) : ''; $code = isset( $_GET['code'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['code'] ) ) : ''; // phpcs:enable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended $enabled = (bool) get_option( 'acrossai_mcp_npm_login_enabled', false ); if ( ! $enabled ) { $this->render_disabled_notice(); $this->terminate(); } switch ( $action ) { case 'cli_auth_approve': $this->handle_approve(); break; case 'cli_auth_approved': $this->handle_approved(); break; case 'cli_auth': default: $this->handle_cli_auth( $code ); } $this->terminate(); } /** * Render the consent form for `?action=cli_auth`. * * 2026-06-30 SEC-001 fix: the displayed server slug is sourced from * CliController::peek_pending_server($code) — the transient's authoritative * server_id — NOT from $_GET['server']. Rendering URL-supplied context * would be a confused-deputy / UI-misrepresentation attack (CWE-451 / * CWE-441 / S9). * * @param string $code Authorization code from CLI's `/auth/start`. */ private function handle_cli_auth( string $code ): void { $bound_server = ( '' !== $code ) ? CliController::peek_pending_server( $code ) : null; if ( '' === $code || null === $bound_server ) { $body = '

' . esc_html__( 'This page must be opened via a link from your CLI tool.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ) . '

'; $body .= '

' . esc_html__( 'Return to your terminal, copy the authentication URL your CLI printed, and open it here.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ) . '

'; $this->render_branded_card( 'info', esc_html__( 'Missing Authentication Parameters', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), $body ); return; } // F015 Access Control connection-time gate — mirror the OAuth authorize + App // Password gates so unauthorized users see a clear denial page instead of // completing consent, receiving a token, and then silently 403-ing on every // tool call. `$bound_server` is a slug; resolve to server_id for AC check. $server_rows = \AcrossAI_MCP_Manager\Includes\Database\MCPServer\Query::instance()->query( array( 'server_slug' => (string) $bound_server, 'number' => 1, ) ); $bound_server_id = ! empty( $server_rows ) ? (int) $server_rows[0]->id : 0; $current_user_id = get_current_user_id(); if ( $bound_server_id > 0 && $current_user_id > 0 ) { $ac = \AcrossAI_MCP_Manager\Includes\AccessControl\AcrossAI_MCP_Access_Control::instance(); if ( ! $ac->user_has_server_access( $current_user_id, $bound_server_id ) ) { do_action( 'acrossai_mcp_access_control_denied', $current_user_id, (string) $bound_server, null, 'cli_device_grant' ); $body = '

' . esc_html__( 'Your account does not have permission to connect a CLI tool to this MCP server.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ) . '

'; $body .= '

' . esc_html__( 'Contact a site administrator to request access. This authorization request has NOT been approved and no credential has been issued.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ) . '

'; $this->render_branded_card( 'error', esc_html__( 'Access Denied', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), $body ); return; } } $approve_url = add_query_arg( array( 'action' => 'cli_auth_approve', 'code' => $code, '_wpnonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'cli_auth_approve_' . $code ), ), self::get_base_url() ); $body = '

' . sprintf( /* translators: 1: server slug from the transient (authoritative source per SEC-001) */ esc_html__( 'A CLI tool is requesting access to your MCP server %1$s.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), '' . esc_html( $bound_server ) . '' ) . '

'; $body .= '

' . esc_html__( 'The session is single-use. Click Approve to grant the tool access.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ) . '

'; $this->render_branded_card( 'consent', esc_html__( 'Authorize CLI Access', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), $body, array( 'url' => esc_url( $approve_url ), 'label' => esc_html__( 'Approve', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), 'style' => 'primary', ) ); } /** * Handle Approve click — state-mutating; called only after per-code nonce * verify. * * 2026-06-30 SEC-002 fix: nonce action is 'cli_auth_approve_' . $code — * per-code binding prevents cross-code replay if the rendered HTML leaks. * $code is read+sanitized BEFORE the nonce check (reading $_GET is not * state mutation; nonce-before-mutation still holds). Empty $code → 400 * BEFORE nonce check to avoid verifying against trailing-underscore. */ private function handle_approve(): void { // phpcs:disable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended -- nonce verified below via wp_verify_nonce with per-code action. $code = isset( $_GET['code'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['code'] ) ) : ''; $nonce = isset( $_GET['_wpnonce'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['_wpnonce'] ) ) : ''; // phpcs:enable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended if ( '' === $code ) { wp_die( esc_html__( 'Missing authorization code.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), '', array( 'response' => 400 ) ); } if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, 'cli_auth_approve_' . $code ) ) { wp_die( esc_html__( 'Security check failed.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), '', array( 'response' => 403 ) ); } $approved = CliController::approve_auth_code( $code, get_current_user_id() ); if ( ! $approved ) { wp_die( esc_html__( 'This authorization code is no longer valid. It may have expired or been used already.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), '', array( 'response' => 400 ) ); } wp_safe_redirect( add_query_arg( 'action', 'cli_auth_approved', self::get_base_url() ) ); $this->terminate(); } /** * Render the success page after `handle_approve` redirect. */ private function handle_approved(): void { $body = '

' . esc_html__( 'You can now return to your CLI tool — it will detect the approval shortly.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ) . '

'; $body .= '

' . esc_html__( 'This page can be closed.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ) . '

'; $this->render_branded_card( 'success', esc_html__( 'CLI Authorization Approved', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), $body ); } /** * Render the kill-switch notice when the feature flag is OFF. * * 2026-06-30 SEC-005 fix: emits Retry-After header and noindex meta to * signal retry timing and prevent search-engine indexing of the * disabled-notice page (CWE-1004). The noindex meta is prepended to the * body payload (invalid HTML per spec — meta belongs in head — but * browsers ignore it in body while robots/crawlers still respect it). * Preserved from pre-2026-07-15 behavior; retasking `render_page_shell` * to accept a head-injectable robots directive is out of scope here. */ private function render_disabled_notice(): void { status_header( 503 ); if ( ! headers_sent() ) { header( 'Retry-After: 3600' ); } $body = ''; $body .= '

' . esc_html__( 'The CLI login flow is currently disabled on this site. Contact your administrator.', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ) . '

'; $this->render_branded_card( 'warning', esc_html__( 'CLI Login Not Enabled', 'acrossai-mcp-manager' ), $body ); } /** * Wrap body content in a minimal HTML shell — NO `wp_head()` / `wp_footer()` * so themes cannot inject markup into the consent flow. * * The enqueued external CSS (handle `acrossai-mcp-frontend`) is printed * via `wp_print_styles()`. A minimal inline `'; echo ''; // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.EscapeOutput.OutputNotEscaped -- caller pre-escapes per the method's docblock contract. echo $body_html; echo ''; } /** * Render a branded card wrapper around the caller-supplied body HTML. * * Introduced 2026-07-15 to replace the four sites that previously echoed * bare `

do_action( 'acrossai_mcp_frontend_auth_before_exit' ); exit; } }